It took "Joe Six Pack" Americans 14 hrs to call Edmonton HQ eh
How long does it take to remove 23 demerit points from a BC drivers licence, for sure?
Robyn Allan the actress/dancer/author/economist changed an Insurance Corporation of BC $200 million deficit into a $150 million profit after the NDP increased B.C. government monopolized auto insurance rates by 29% for all drivers except her she got her car insurance free.1993 B.C.Legislative Debates records also stated:"perks for Crown corporation heads, including free ICBC car insurance for Robyn Allan""Robyn Allan's driving record was also hidden" The Cariboo Observer newspaper reported;"The NDP government, hell bent on having one of its own anointed heading Insurance Corporation of B.C., is hoping that there is enough delay in the selection process that the erratic Robyn Allan can be confirmed in the post. Ms. Allan, in case the rush of ordinary government disaster is erasing her name from your memory, is the lady who racked up 23 demerit points by doing such things as speeding in school zones and banging into other cars while driving under probation. She seemed puzzled that the common people cared about this. With Ms. Allan, as with former premier Bill Vanderzalm, all truths emerge very slowly. For a long time her minister was telling us what a taut ship she ran but now the figures have been released and it turns that she increased administrative costs at ICBC by a staggering 14 per cent in a single year. It would not be surprising if also in the style of Mr. Vanderzalm talking to the enquiry commissioner, she feels that there would never be any never be any problem if only the wretched press could learn to stop running around reporting facts. Meanwhile, unless there has been some announcement to the contrary which has escaped the taxpaying rabble, the hunt goes on for the ICBC employee who blew the whistle on Ms. Allan. We have been told there are 30 suspects, all people with computer access to her bad driving files. One of them, apparently, sneaked her record to the newspapers. The first question to strike the fine-paying, tax-paying ordinary driver is why is such information secret? When speeding fines were paid in court, it was a matter of public record. So were accident reports , such as the accident reports to police which Ms. Allan inspired. True, scarcely any newspapers bothered printing the reports. There were and are, somewhat larger matters to report than whether some ordinary citizen has a lead foot."
By Debbie Hersman At the NTSB, we don’t have the power to pass laws, regulations or issue fines. Our charge is to thoroughly investigate accidents, analyze trends and make our best recommendations on how to make transportation safer.
Enbridge, Inc. Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Rupture
July 25, 2010 Marshall, MI
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD Public Meeting of July 10, 2012 (Information subject to editing) NTSB/PAR-12/01
This is a synopsis from the National Transportation Safety Board's report and does not include the NTSB's rationale for the conclusions, probable cause, and safety recommendations. Safety Board staff is currently making final revisions to the report from which the attached conclusions and safety recommendations have been extracted. The final report and pertinent safety recommendation letters will be distributed to recommendation recipients as soon as possible. The attached information is subject to further review and editing.
Executive Summary
On Sunday, July 25, 2010, at 5:58 p.m., eastern daylight time, a segment of a 30-inch-diameter pipeline (Line 6B), owned and operated by Enbridge Incorporated (Enbridge) ruptured in a wetland in Marshall, Michigan. The rupture occurred during the last stages of a planned shutdown and was not discovered or addressed for over 17 hours. During the time lapse, Enbridge twice pumped additional oil (81 percent of the total release) into Line 6B during two startups; the total release was estimated to be 843,444 gallons of crude oil. The oil saturated the surrounding wetlands and flowed into the Talmadge Creek and the Kalamazoo River. Local residents self-evacuated from their houses, and the environment was negatively affected. Cleanup efforts continue as of the adoption date of this report, with continuing costs exceeding $767 million. About 320 people reported symptoms consistent with crude oil exposure. No fatalities were reported.
Conclusions
1. The following were not factors in this accident: cathodic protection, microbial corrosion, internal corrosion, transportation-induced metal fatigue, third-party damage, and pipe manufacturing defects.
2. Insufficient information was available from the postaccident alcohol testing; however, the postaccident drug testing showed that use of illegal drugs was not a factor in the accident.
3. Had the firefighters discovered the ruptured segment of Line 6B and called Enbridge, the two startups of the pipeline might not have occurred and the additional volume might not have been pumped.
4. The Line 6B segment ruptured under normal operating pressure due to corrosion fatigue cracks that grew and coalesced from multiple stress corrosion cracks, which had initiated in areas of external of corrosion beneath the disbonded polyethylene tape coating.
5. Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 195.452(h) does not provide clear requirements regarding when to repair and when to remediate pipeline defects and inadequately defines the requirements for assessing the effect on pipeline integrity when either crack defects or cracks and corrosion are simultaneously present in the pipeline.
6. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) failed to pursue findings from previous inspections and did not require Enbridge Incorporated (Enbridge) to excavate pipe segments with injurious crack defects.
7. Enbridge's delayed reporting of the "discovery of condition" by more than 460 days indicates that Enbridge's interpretation of the current regulation delayed the repair of the pipeline.
8. Enbridge's integrity management program was inadequate because it did not consider the following: a sufficient margin of safety, appropriate wall thickness, tool tolerances, use of a continuous reassessment approach to incorporate lessons learned, the effects of corrosion on crack depth sizing, and accelerated crack growth rates due to corrosion fatigue on corroded pipe with a failed coating.
9. To improve pipeline safety, a uniform and systematic approach in evaluating data for various types of in-line inspection tools is necessary to determine the effect of the interaction of various threats to a pipeline.
10. Pipeline operators should not wait until PHMSA promulgates revisions to 49 Code of Federal Regulations 195.452 before taking action to improve pipeline safety.
11. PII Pipeline Solutions' analysis of the 2005 in-line inspection data for the Line 6B segment that ruptured mischaracterized crack defects, which resulted in Enbridge not evaluating them as crack-field defects.
12. The ineffective performance of control center staff led them to misinterpret the rupture as a column separation, which led them to attempt two subsequent startups of the line.
13. Enbridge failed to train control center staff in team performance, thereby inadequately preparing the control center staff to perform effectively as a team when effective team performance was most needed.
14. Enbridge failed to ensure that all control center staff had adequate knowledge, skills, and abilities to recognize and address pipeline leaks, and their limited exposure to meaningful leak recognition training diminished their ability to correctly identify the cause of the Material Balance System (MBS) alarms.
15. The Enbridge control center and MBS procedures for leak detection alarms and identification did not fully address the potential for leaks during shutdown and startup, and Enbridge management did not prohibit control center staff from using unapproved procedures.
16. Enbridge's control center staff placed a greater emphasis on the MBS analyst's flawed interpretation of the leak detection system's alarms than it did on reliable indications of a leak, such as zero pressure, despite known limitations of the leak detection system.
17. Enbridge control center staff misinterpreted the absence of external notifications as evidence that Line 6B had not ruptured.
18. Although Enbridge had procedures that required a pipeline shutdown after 10 minutes of uncertain operational status, Enbridge control center staff had developed a culture that accepted not adhering to the procedures.
19. Enbridge's review of its public awareness program was ineffective in identifying and correcting deficiencies.
20. Had Enbridge operated an effective public awareness program, local emergency response agencies would have been better prepared to respond to early indications of the rupture and may have been able to locate the crude oil and notify Enbridge before control center staff tried to start the line.
21. Although Enbridge quickly isolated the ruptured segment of Line 6B after receiving a telephone call about the release, Enbridge's emergency response actions during the initial hours following the release were not sufficiently focused on source control and demonstrated a lack of awareness and training in the use of effective containment methods.
22. Had Enbridge implemented effective oil containment measures for fast-flowing waters, the amount of oil that reached Talmadge Creek and the Kalamazoo River could have been reduced.
23. PHMSA's regulatory requirements for response capability planning do not ensure a high level of preparedness equivalent to the more stringent requirements of the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
24. Without specific Federal spill response preparedness standards, pipeline operators do not have response planning guidance for a worst-case discharge.
25. The Enbridge facility response plan did not identify and ensure sufficient resources were available for the response to the pipeline release in this accident.
26. If PHMSA had dedicated the resources necessary and conducted a thorough review of the Enbridge facility response plan, it would have disapproved the plan because it did not adequately provide for response to a worst-case discharge.
27. Enbridge's failure to exercise effective oversight of pipeline integrity and control center operations, implement an effective public awareness program, and implement an adequate postaccident response were organizational failures that resulted in the accident and increased its severity.
28. Pipeline safety would be enhanced if pipeline companies implemented safety management systems.
Probable Cause
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determines that the probable cause of the pipeline rupture was corrosion fatigue cracks that grew and coalesced from crack and corrosion defects under disbonded polyethylene tape coating, producing a substantial crude oil release that went undetected by the control center for over 17 hours. The rupture and prolonged release were made possible by pervasive organizational failures at Enbridge Incorporated (Enbridge) that included the following:
Deficient integrity management procedures, which allowed well-documented crack defects in corroded areas to propagate until the pipeline failed.Inadequate training of control center personnel, which allowed the rupture to remain undetected for 17 hours and through two startups of the pipeline.Insufficient public awareness and education, which allowed the release to continue for nearly 14 hours after the first notification of an odor to local emergency response agencies.
Contributing to the accident was the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's (PHMSA) weak regulation for assessing and repairing crack indications, as well as PHMSA's ineffective oversight of pipeline integrity management programs, control center procedures, and public awareness.
Contributing to the severity of the environmental consequences were (1) Enbridge's failure to identify and ensure the availability of well-trained emergency responders with sufficient response resources, (2) PHMSA's lack of regulatory guidance for pipeline facility response planning, and (3) PHMSA's limited oversight of pipeline emergency preparedness that led to the approval of a deficient facility response plan.
Recommendations
To the U.S. Secretary of Transportation:
1. Audit the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's onshore pipeline facility response plan program's business practices, including reviews of response plans and drill programs, and take appropriate action to correct deficiencies.
2. Allocate sufficient resources as necessary to ensure that the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's onshore pipeline facility response plan program meets all of the requirements of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.
To the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration:
3. Revise Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 195.452 to clearly state (1) when an engineering assessment of crack defects, including environmentally assisted cracks, must be performed; (2) the acceptable methods for performing these engineering assessments, including the assessment of cracks coinciding with corrosion with a safety factor that considers the uncertainties associated with sizing of crack defects; (3) criteria for determining when a probable crack defect in a pipeline segment must be excavated and time limits for completing those excavations; (4) pressure restriction limits for crack defects that are not excavated by the required date; and (5) acceptable methods for determining crack growth for any cracks allowed to remain in the pipe, including growth caused by fatigue, corrosion fatigue, or stress corrosion cracking as applicable.
4. Revise Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 195.452(h)(2), the "discovery of condition," to require, in cases where a determination about pipeline threats has not been obtained within 180 days following the date of inspection, that pipeline operators notify the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration and provide an expected date when adequate information will become available.
5. Conduct a comprehensive inspection of Enbridge Incorporated's integrity management program after it is revised in accordance with Safety Recommendation (11).
6. Issue an advisory to all hazardous liquid and natural gas pipeline operators describing the circumstances of the accident in Marshall, Michigan—including the deficiencies observed in Enbridge Incorporated's integrity management program—and ask them to take appropriate action to eliminate similar deficiencies.
7. Develop requirements for team training of control center staff involved in pipeline operations similar to those used in other transportation modes.
8. Extend operator qualification requirements in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 195 Subpart G to all hazardous liquid and gas transmission control center staff involved in pipeline operational decisions.
9. Amend Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 194 to harmonize onshore oil pipeline response planning requirements with those of the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for facilities that handle and transport oil and petroleum products to ensure that pipeline operators have adequate resources available to respond to worst-case discharges.
10. Issue an advisory bulletin to notify pipeline operators (1) of the circumstances of the Marshall, Michigan, pipeline accident, and (2) of the need to identify deficiencies in facility response plans and to update these plans as necessary to conform with the nonmandatory guidance for determining and evaluating required response resources as provided in Appendix A of Title 49Code of Federal Regulations 194, "Guidelines for the Preparation of Response Plans."
To Enbridge Incorporated:
11. Revise your integrity management program to ensure the integrity of your hazardous liquid pipelines as follows: (1) implement, as part of the excavation selection process, a safety margin that conservatively takes into account the uncertainties associated with the sizing of crack defects from in-line inspections; (2) implement procedures that apply a continuous reassessment approach to immediately incorporate any new relevant information as it becomes available and reevaluate the integrity of all pipelines within the program; (3) develop and implement a methodology that includes local corrosion wall loss in addition to the crack depth when performing engineering assessments of crack defects coincident with areas of corrosion; and (4) develop and implement a corrosion fatigue model for pipelines under cyclic loading that estimates growth rates for cracks that coincide with areas of corrosion when determining reinspection intervals.
12. Establish a program to train control center staff as teams, semiannually, in the recognition of and response to emergency and unexpected conditions that includes supervisory control and data acquisition system indications and Material Balance System software.
13. Incorporate changes to your leak detection processes to ensure that accurate leak detection coverage is maintained during transient operations, including pipeline shutdown, pipeline startup, and column separation.
14. Provide additional training to first responders to ensure that they (1) are aware of the best response practices and the potential consequences of oil releases and (2) receive practical training in the use of appropriate oil-containment and -recovery methods for all potential environmental conditions in the response zones.
15. Review and update your oil pipeline emergency response procedures and equipment resources to ensure that appropriate containment equipment and methods are available to respond to all environments and at all locations along the pipeline to minimize the spread of oil from a pipeline rupture.
16. Update your facility response plan to identify adequate resources to respond to and mitigate a worst-case discharge for all weather conditions and for all your pipeline locations before the required resubmittal in 2015.
To the American Petroleum Institute:
17. Facilitate the development of a safety management system standard specific to the pipeline industry that is similar in scope to your Recommended Practice 750, Management of Process Hazards. The development should follow established American National Standards Institute requirements for standard development.
To the Pipeline Research Council International, Inc.:
18. Conduct a review of various in-line inspection tools and technologies—including, but not limited to: tool tolerance, the probability of detection, and the probability of identification—and provide a model with detailed step-by-step procedures to pipeline operators for evaluating the effect of interacting corrosion and crack threats on the integrity of pipelines.
To the International Association of Fire Chiefs and the National Emergency Number Association:
19. Inform your members about the circumstances of the Marshall, Michigan, pipeline accident and urge your members to aggressively and diligently gather from pipeline operators system-specific information about the pipeline systems in their communities and jurisdictions.
Previous Recommendation Reiterated in this Report
To the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration:
Require operators of natural gas transmission and distribution pipelines and hazardous liquid pipelines to provide system-specific information about their pipeline systems to the emergency response agencies of the communities and jurisdictions in which those pipelines are located. This information should include pipe diameter, operating pressure, product transported, and potential impact radius. (P-11-8)
Your Chums Are Fighting - Why Aren't You?: recruitment campaign
Conscription: What is it?
Conscription is compulsory enlistment for military or state service. In the United States, it is better known as "the draft." When conscription becomes law, you must enlist, otherwise you go to jail.Conscription into military service during a time of war builds an army in a short period of time. Usually healthy men in a specific age group are called to serve.Conscription into state service during a time of war supports the war effort by building arms, munitions and machinery. Men and women are asked to work for the government or specific companies.There have been military service and state serviceconscriptions in Canada to support the war effort in both the First World War (1914—1919) and the Second World War (1939—1945).
The First World War military conscription profoundly divided the country. At the beginning of the war, only volunteers were recruited, but as the war went on, the number of volunteers declined significantly. Britain pressured Canadian Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden for additional military support, and in 1917, Borden imposed conscription.Conscription created a major crisis that divided the country.Two groups were opposed: the first group, Canadians of British descent or supporters of the British Empire, favoured additional military support for Britain. The other group, comprised mainly of French Canadians, felt no loyalty to Britain, because historically Britain was the conqueror of French Canada. This group was completely against sending anyone other than volunteers to the war.Moreover, French Canadians living in Quebec tended to marry and have children at a very young age. Conscription typically forced young fathers to leave their family to go off to war.When Sir Robert Borden imposed conscription, there were many riots and protests within the French community. The Canadian Army was used to police a public protest in Quebec City. At a public protest, shots were fired into a crowd of French Canadians, killing five people. This really left the country divided.Sir Robert Borden was not re-elected in the next election. The French Canadian majority in Quebec voted against Robert Borden and his Unionist Party.
Second World War: How Canada was officially involved:
September 1, 1939, Germany invades Poland with nearly two million soldiers.September 3, 1939, Britain and France declare war on Germany following the invasion of Poland by German troops. Unlike in the First World War, Canada did not automatically go to war once Britain made its war declaration. This is because in 1931 the British Empire approved the Statute of Westminster, an agreement making all British Dominions independent and having their own responsibility for foreign affairs.Mackenzie King held a special sitting of Parliament with a vote immediately following the debate in the House of Commons. The majority of the Members of Parliament voted to have Canada join Britain and France in the war against Germany.September 10, 1939, Canada officially declares war on Germany.
Audio
William Lyon Mackenzie King tells Canadians that they must be "strong, secure and united," September 3, 1939.
At this point, the future of Canada at war was unknown, but all Members of Parliament were focused on keeping Canada united. They would not permit a recurrence of the bloody events surrounding the First World War conscription. The majority agreed with the Prime Minister that no conscription would be imposed.French and English Canadians flocked to enlist in support of the British Empire and France. Most Canadians embraced the battle for freedom and democracy against the Nazi regime.From the very beginning of the conflict, Canadians actively participated in the war effort. Although French Canadians were in agreement that Canada should declare war, they were absolutely against compulsory military service for overseas operations. There were many reasons for their lack of enthusiasm. Having been separated from France politically, culturally and demographically for nearly two centuries, they were not concerned with the European conflict. They had very few ties left with France. They also had no loyalty to England which was still perceived as the conqueror. The Prime Minister, counselled by his colleague Ernest Lapointe, reassured French Canadians that there would be no conscription.
By 1942, the Nazis controlled most of Europe. With the support of many English Canadians, Great Britain pressured the Prime Minister to increase the Canadian war effort by imposing conscription.As the war continued, the Prime Minister was pressured more and more towards imposing conscription, but this was against his original promise of "not necessarily conscription" to the Canadian people. He decided to hold a national plebiscite, the results of which would support any future decision on conscription and absolve him from any previous promises to the electorate. A plebiscite is a vote of the entire electorate on a national issue. However, in a plebiscite, the leader does not have to follow the wishes of the majority.The national outcome of the plebiscite was in support of conscription. However, in Quebec, 72% of the population had voted against it. Once again French Canadians were confronted with the threat of an imposed military conscription.
Although supported by the majority of the electorate, Mackenzie King was hesitant to immediately proceed with conscription given the outcome of this same action back in the First World War. Cautiously, he waited two years before imposing conscription.In 1944, conscription was imposed. The Prime Minister, however, limited the number of Canadian soldiers sent overseas to 16,000.Many historians believe that this careful manoeuvring by the Prime Minister prevented a serious crisis in Canada, one which could have deepened the rift between its French and English citizens.
How long does it take to remove 23 demerit points from a BC drivers licence, for sure?
Robyn Allan the actress/dancer/author/economist changed an Insurance Corporation of BC $200 million deficit into a $150 million profit after the NDP increased B.C. government monopolized auto insurance rates by 29% for all drivers except her she got her car insurance free.1993 B.C.Legislative Debates records also stated:"perks for Crown corporation heads, including free ICBC car insurance for Robyn Allan""Robyn Allan's driving record was also hidden" The Cariboo Observer newspaper reported;"The NDP government, hell bent on having one of its own anointed heading Insurance Corporation of B.C., is hoping that there is enough delay in the selection process that the erratic Robyn Allan can be confirmed in the post. Ms. Allan, in case the rush of ordinary government disaster is erasing her name from your memory, is the lady who racked up 23 demerit points by doing such things as speeding in school zones and banging into other cars while driving under probation. She seemed puzzled that the common people cared about this. With Ms. Allan, as with former premier Bill Vanderzalm, all truths emerge very slowly. For a long time her minister was telling us what a taut ship she ran but now the figures have been released and it turns that she increased administrative costs at ICBC by a staggering 14 per cent in a single year. It would not be surprising if also in the style of Mr. Vanderzalm talking to the enquiry commissioner, she feels that there would never be any never be any problem if only the wretched press could learn to stop running around reporting facts. Meanwhile, unless there has been some announcement to the contrary which has escaped the taxpaying rabble, the hunt goes on for the ICBC employee who blew the whistle on Ms. Allan. We have been told there are 30 suspects, all people with computer access to her bad driving files. One of them, apparently, sneaked her record to the newspapers. The first question to strike the fine-paying, tax-paying ordinary driver is why is such information secret? When speeding fines were paid in court, it was a matter of public record. So were accident reports , such as the accident reports to police which Ms. Allan inspired. True, scarcely any newspapers bothered printing the reports. There were and are, somewhat larger matters to report than whether some ordinary citizen has a lead foot."http://www.cawildlife.org/media-center-landing-menu/videos-mnu/89-video-...
By Debbie Hersman At the NTSB, we don’t have the power to pass laws, regulations or issue fines. Our charge is to thoroughly investigate accidents, analyze trends and make our best recommendations on how to make transportation safer.
Enbridge, Inc. Hazardous Liquid Pipeline RuptureJuly 25, 2010
Marshall, MI
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Public Meeting of July 10, 2012
(Information subject to editing)
NTSB/PAR-12/01
This is a synopsis from the National Transportation Safety Board's report and does not include the NTSB's rationale for the conclusions, probable cause, and safety recommendations. Safety Board staff is currently making final revisions to the report from which the attached conclusions and safety recommendations have been extracted. The final report and pertinent safety recommendation letters will be distributed to recommendation recipients as soon as possible. The attached information is subject to further review and editing.
Executive SummaryOn Sunday, July 25, 2010, at 5:58 p.m., eastern daylight time, a segment of a 30-inch-diameter pipeline (Line 6B), owned and operated by Enbridge Incorporated (Enbridge) ruptured in a wetland in Marshall, Michigan. The rupture occurred during the last stages of a planned shutdown and was not discovered or addressed for over 17 hours. During the time lapse, Enbridge twice pumped additional oil (81 percent of the total release) into Line 6B during two startups; the total release was estimated to be 843,444 gallons of crude oil. The oil saturated the surrounding wetlands and flowed into the Talmadge Creek and the Kalamazoo River. Local residents self-evacuated from their houses, and the environment was negatively affected. Cleanup efforts continue as of the adoption date of this report, with continuing costs exceeding $767 million. About 320 people reported symptoms consistent with crude oil exposure. No fatalities were reported.
Conclusions1. The following were not factors in this accident: cathodic protection, microbial corrosion, internal corrosion, transportation-induced metal fatigue, third-party damage, and pipe manufacturing defects.
2. Insufficient information was available from the postaccident alcohol testing; however, the postaccident drug testing showed that use of illegal drugs was not a factor in the accident.
3. Had the firefighters discovered the ruptured segment of Line 6B and called Enbridge, the two startups of the pipeline might not have occurred and the additional volume might not have been pumped.
4. The Line 6B segment ruptured under normal operating pressure due to corrosion fatigue cracks that grew and coalesced from multiple stress corrosion cracks, which had initiated in areas of external of corrosion beneath the disbonded polyethylene tape coating.
5. Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 195.452(h) does not provide clear requirements regarding when to repair and when to remediate pipeline defects and inadequately defines the requirements for assessing the effect on pipeline integrity when either crack defects or cracks and corrosion are simultaneously present in the pipeline.
6. The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) failed to pursue findings from previous inspections and did not require Enbridge Incorporated (Enbridge) to excavate pipe segments with injurious crack defects.
7. Enbridge's delayed reporting of the "discovery of condition" by more than 460 days indicates that Enbridge's interpretation of the current regulation delayed the repair of the pipeline.
8. Enbridge's integrity management program was inadequate because it did not consider the following: a sufficient margin of safety, appropriate wall thickness, tool tolerances, use of a continuous reassessment approach to incorporate lessons learned, the effects of corrosion on crack depth sizing, and accelerated crack growth rates due to corrosion fatigue on corroded pipe with a failed coating.
9. To improve pipeline safety, a uniform and systematic approach in evaluating data for various types of in-line inspection tools is necessary to determine the effect of the interaction of various threats to a pipeline.
10. Pipeline operators should not wait until PHMSA promulgates revisions to 49 Code of Federal Regulations 195.452 before taking action to improve pipeline safety.
11. PII Pipeline Solutions' analysis of the 2005 in-line inspection data for the Line 6B segment that ruptured mischaracterized crack defects, which resulted in Enbridge not evaluating them as crack-field defects.
12. The ineffective performance of control center staff led them to misinterpret the rupture as a column separation, which led them to attempt two subsequent startups of the line.
13. Enbridge failed to train control center staff in team performance, thereby inadequately preparing the control center staff to perform effectively as a team when effective team performance was most needed.
14. Enbridge failed to ensure that all control center staff had adequate knowledge, skills, and abilities to recognize and address pipeline leaks, and their limited exposure to meaningful leak recognition training diminished their ability to correctly identify the cause of the Material Balance System (MBS) alarms.
15. The Enbridge control center and MBS procedures for leak detection alarms and identification did not fully address the potential for leaks during shutdown and startup, and Enbridge management did not prohibit control center staff from using unapproved procedures.
16. Enbridge's control center staff placed a greater emphasis on the MBS analyst's flawed interpretation of the leak detection system's alarms than it did on reliable indications of a leak, such as zero pressure, despite known limitations of the leak detection system.
17. Enbridge control center staff misinterpreted the absence of external notifications as evidence that Line 6B had not ruptured.
18. Although Enbridge had procedures that required a pipeline shutdown after 10 minutes of uncertain operational status, Enbridge control center staff had developed a culture that accepted not adhering to the procedures.
19. Enbridge's review of its public awareness program was ineffective in identifying and correcting deficiencies.
20. Had Enbridge operated an effective public awareness program, local emergency response agencies would have been better prepared to respond to early indications of the rupture and may have been able to locate the crude oil and notify Enbridge before control center staff tried to start the line.
21. Although Enbridge quickly isolated the ruptured segment of Line 6B after receiving a telephone call about the release, Enbridge's emergency response actions during the initial hours following the release were not sufficiently focused on source control and demonstrated a lack of awareness and training in the use of effective containment methods.
22. Had Enbridge implemented effective oil containment measures for fast-flowing waters, the amount of oil that reached Talmadge Creek and the Kalamazoo River could have been reduced.
23. PHMSA's regulatory requirements for response capability planning do not ensure a high level of preparedness equivalent to the more stringent requirements of the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.
24. Without specific Federal spill response preparedness standards, pipeline operators do not have response planning guidance for a worst-case discharge.
25. The Enbridge facility response plan did not identify and ensure sufficient resources were available for the response to the pipeline release in this accident.
26. If PHMSA had dedicated the resources necessary and conducted a thorough review of the Enbridge facility response plan, it would have disapproved the plan because it did not adequately provide for response to a worst-case discharge.
27. Enbridge's failure to exercise effective oversight of pipeline integrity and control center operations, implement an effective public awareness program, and implement an adequate postaccident response were organizational failures that resulted in the accident and increased its severity.
28. Pipeline safety would be enhanced if pipeline companies implemented safety management systems.
Probable CauseThe National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determines that the probable cause of the pipeline rupture was corrosion fatigue cracks that grew and coalesced from crack and corrosion defects under disbonded polyethylene tape coating, producing a substantial crude oil release that went undetected by the control center for over 17 hours. The rupture and prolonged release were made possible by pervasive organizational failures at Enbridge Incorporated (Enbridge) that included the following:
Deficient integrity management procedures, which allowed well-documented crack defects in corroded areas to propagate until the pipeline failed.Inadequate training of control center personnel, which allowed the rupture to remain undetected for 17 hours and through two startups of the pipeline.Insufficient public awareness and education, which allowed the release to continue for nearly 14 hours after the first notification of an odor to local emergency response agencies.Contributing to the accident was the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's (PHMSA) weak regulation for assessing and repairing crack indications, as well as PHMSA's ineffective oversight of pipeline integrity management programs, control center procedures, and public awareness.
Contributing to the severity of the environmental consequences were (1) Enbridge's failure to identify and ensure the availability of well-trained emergency responders with sufficient response resources, (2) PHMSA's lack of regulatory guidance for pipeline facility response planning, and (3) PHMSA's limited oversight of pipeline emergency preparedness that led to the approval of a deficient facility response plan.
RecommendationsTo the U.S. Secretary of Transportation:
1. Audit the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's onshore pipeline facility response plan program's business practices, including reviews of response plans and drill programs, and take appropriate action to correct deficiencies.
2. Allocate sufficient resources as necessary to ensure that the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration's onshore pipeline facility response plan program meets all of the requirements of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.
To the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration:
3. Revise Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 195.452 to clearly state (1) when an engineering assessment of crack defects, including environmentally assisted cracks, must be performed; (2) the acceptable methods for performing these engineering assessments, including the assessment of cracks coinciding with corrosion with a safety factor that considers the uncertainties associated with sizing of crack defects; (3) criteria for determining when a probable crack defect in a pipeline segment must be excavated and time limits for completing those excavations; (4) pressure restriction limits for crack defects that are not excavated by the required date; and (5) acceptable methods for determining crack growth for any cracks allowed to remain in the pipe, including growth caused by fatigue, corrosion fatigue, or stress corrosion cracking as applicable.
4. Revise Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 195.452(h)(2), the "discovery of condition," to require, in cases where a determination about pipeline threats has not been obtained within 180 days following the date of inspection, that pipeline operators notify the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration and provide an expected date when adequate information will become available.
5. Conduct a comprehensive inspection of Enbridge Incorporated's integrity management program after it is revised in accordance with Safety Recommendation (11).
6. Issue an advisory to all hazardous liquid and natural gas pipeline operators describing the circumstances of the accident in Marshall, Michigan—including the deficiencies observed in Enbridge Incorporated's integrity management program—and ask them to take appropriate action to eliminate similar deficiencies.
7. Develop requirements for team training of control center staff involved in pipeline operations similar to those used in other transportation modes.
8. Extend operator qualification requirements in Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations 195 Subpart G to all hazardous liquid and gas transmission control center staff involved in pipeline operational decisions.
9. Amend Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 194 to harmonize onshore oil pipeline response planning requirements with those of the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for facilities that handle and transport oil and petroleum products to ensure that pipeline operators have adequate resources available to respond to worst-case discharges.
10. Issue an advisory bulletin to notify pipeline operators (1) of the circumstances of the Marshall, Michigan, pipeline accident, and (2) of the need to identify deficiencies in facility response plans and to update these plans as necessary to conform with the nonmandatory guidance for determining and evaluating required response resources as provided in Appendix A of Title 49Code of Federal Regulations 194, "Guidelines for the Preparation of Response Plans."
To Enbridge Incorporated:
11. Revise your integrity management program to ensure the integrity of your hazardous liquid pipelines as follows: (1) implement, as part of the excavation selection process, a safety margin that conservatively takes into account the uncertainties associated with the sizing of crack defects from in-line inspections; (2) implement procedures that apply a continuous reassessment approach to immediately incorporate any new relevant information as it becomes available and reevaluate the integrity of all pipelines within the program; (3) develop and implement a methodology that includes local corrosion wall loss in addition to the crack depth when performing engineering assessments of crack defects coincident with areas of corrosion; and (4) develop and implement a corrosion fatigue model for pipelines under cyclic loading that estimates growth rates for cracks that coincide with areas of corrosion when determining reinspection intervals.
12. Establish a program to train control center staff as teams, semiannually, in the recognition of and response to emergency and unexpected conditions that includes supervisory control and data acquisition system indications and Material Balance System software.
13. Incorporate changes to your leak detection processes to ensure that accurate leak detection coverage is maintained during transient operations, including pipeline shutdown, pipeline startup, and column separation.
14. Provide additional training to first responders to ensure that they (1) are aware of the best response practices and the potential consequences of oil releases and (2) receive practical training in the use of appropriate oil-containment and -recovery methods for all potential environmental conditions in the response zones.
15. Review and update your oil pipeline emergency response procedures and equipment resources to ensure that appropriate containment equipment and methods are available to respond to all environments and at all locations along the pipeline to minimize the spread of oil from a pipeline rupture.
16. Update your facility response plan to identify adequate resources to respond to and mitigate a worst-case discharge for all weather conditions and for all your pipeline locations before the required resubmittal in 2015.
To the American Petroleum Institute:
17. Facilitate the development of a safety management system standard specific to the pipeline industry that is similar in scope to your Recommended Practice 750, Management of Process Hazards. The development should follow established American National Standards Institute requirements for standard development.
To the Pipeline Research Council International, Inc.:
18. Conduct a review of various in-line inspection tools and technologies—including, but not limited to: tool tolerance, the probability of detection, and the probability of identification—and provide a model with detailed step-by-step procedures to pipeline operators for evaluating the effect of interacting corrosion and crack threats on the integrity of pipelines.
To the International Association of Fire Chiefs and the National Emergency Number Association:
19. Inform your members about the circumstances of the Marshall, Michigan, pipeline accident and urge your members to aggressively and diligently gather from pipeline operators system-specific information about the pipeline systems in their communities and jurisdictions.
Previous Recommendation Reiterated in this ReportTo the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration:
Require operators of natural gas transmission and distribution pipelines and hazardous liquid pipelines to provide system-specific information about their pipeline systems to the emergency response agencies of the communities and jurisdictions in which those pipelines are located. This information should include pipe diameter, operating pressure, product transported, and potential impact radius. (P-11-8)
http://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/2012/marshall_mi/index.html
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Your Chums Are Fighting - Why Aren't You?: recruitment campaign
Conscription: What is it?
Conscription is compulsory enlistment for military or state service. In the United States, it is better known as "the draft." When conscription becomes law, you must enlist, otherwise you go to jail.Conscription into military service during a time of war builds an army in a short period of time. Usually healthy men in a specific age group are called to serve.Conscription into state service during a time of war supports the war effort by building arms, munitions and machinery. Men and women are asked to work for the government or specific companies.There have been military service and state serviceconscriptions in Canada to support the war effort in both the First World War (1914—1919) and the Second World War (1939—1945).Top of Page
First World War Conscription events
The First World War military conscription profoundly divided the country. At the beginning of the war, only volunteers were recruited, but as the war went on, the number of volunteers declined significantly. Britain pressured Canadian Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden for additional military support, and in 1917, Borden imposed conscription.Conscription created a major crisis that divided the country.Two groups were opposed: the first group, Canadians of British descent or supporters of the British Empire, favoured additional military support for Britain. The other group, comprised mainly of French Canadians, felt no loyalty to Britain, because historically Britain was the conqueror of French Canada. This group was completely against sending anyone other than volunteers to the war.Moreover, French Canadians living in Quebec tended to marry and have children at a very young age. Conscription typically forced young fathers to leave their family to go off to war.When Sir Robert Borden imposed conscription, there were many riots and protests within the French community. The Canadian Army was used to police a public protest in Quebec City. At a public protest, shots were fired into a crowd of French Canadians, killing five people. This really left the country divided.Sir Robert Borden was not re-elected in the next election. The French Canadian majority in Quebec voted against Robert Borden and his Unionist Party.Source
Young men from Metcalfe who enlisted in the 77th Battalion, Canadian Expeditionary Force
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Anti-conscription parade at Victoria Square
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Second World War: How Canada was officially involved:
September 1, 1939, Germany invades Poland with nearly two million soldiers.September 3, 1939, Britain and France declare war on Germany following the invasion of Poland by German troops. Unlike in the First World War, Canada did not automatically go to war once Britain made its war declaration. This is because in 1931 the British Empire approved the Statute of Westminster, an agreement making all British Dominions independent and having their own responsibility for foreign affairs.Mackenzie King held a special sitting of Parliament with a vote immediately following the debate in the House of Commons. The majority of the Members of Parliament voted to have Canada join Britain and France in the war against Germany.September 10, 1939, Canada officially declares war on Germany.Audio
William Lyon Mackenzie King tells Canadians that they must be "strong, secure and united," September 3, 1939.
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Ref No: 74651
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At the beginning of the war...
At this point, the future of Canada at war was unknown, but all Members of Parliament were focused on keeping Canada united. They would not permit a recurrence of the bloody events surrounding the First World War conscription. The majority agreed with the Prime Minister that no conscription would be imposed.French and English Canadians flocked to enlist in support of the British Empire and France. Most Canadians embraced the battle for freedom and democracy against the Nazi regime.From the very beginning of the conflict, Canadians actively participated in the war effort. Although French Canadians were in agreement that Canada should declare war, they were absolutely against compulsory military service for overseas operations. There were many reasons for their lack of enthusiasm. Having been separated from France politically, culturally and demographically for nearly two centuries, they were not concerned with the European conflict. They had very few ties left with France. They also had no loyalty to England which was still perceived as the conqueror. The Prime Minister, counselled by his colleague Ernest Lapointe, reassured French Canadians that there would be no conscription.Source
Unidentified soldiers landing at Arromanches, France, 23 July 1944.
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Troops in landing craft preparing to go ashore during Operation JUBILEE, the raid on Dieppe
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The Plebiscite
By 1942, the Nazis controlled most of Europe. With the support of many English Canadians, Great Britain pressured the Prime Minister to increase the Canadian war effort by imposing conscription.As the war continued, the Prime Minister was pressured more and more towards imposing conscription, but this was against his original promise of "not necessarily conscription" to the Canadian people. He decided to hold a national plebiscite, the results of which would support any future decision on conscription and absolve him from any previous promises to the electorate. A plebiscite is a vote of the entire electorate on a national issue. However, in a plebiscite, the leader does not have to follow the wishes of the majority.The national outcome of the plebiscite was in support of conscription. However, in Quebec, 72% of the population had voted against it. Once again French Canadians were confronted with the threat of an imposed military conscription.Source
Rt. Hon. W.L. Mackenzie King, Prime Minister of Canada, with children, on the day of the plebiscite concerning the introduction of conscription
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Rt. Hon. W.L. Mackenzie King voting in the plebiscite on the introduction of conscription for overseas military service
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Imposing Conscription
Although supported by the majority of the electorate, Mackenzie King was hesitant to immediately proceed with conscription given the outcome of this same action back in the First World War. Cautiously, he waited two years before imposing conscription.In 1944, conscription was imposed. The Prime Minister, however, limited the number of Canadian soldiers sent overseas to 16,000.Many historians believe that this careful manoeuvring by the Prime Minister prevented a serious crisis in Canada, one which could have deepened the rift between its French and English citizens.Video
"Canadian Premiere Arrives in England," 1944
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Ref No: 33103